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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
Plaintiffs Misstate the Facts 
Plaintiffs, at page 4 of their Petition, seriously 
misstate the facts concerning UDOT's evaluation and 
recommendation regarding the Droubay Road crossing. 
Plaintiffs would have the Court believe that UDOT found the 
crossing warning devices inadequate in November, 1981 and, 
based upon such findings, recommended installation of 
automatic signals and then failed to follow through on such 
recommendation. This simply is not the case. To the 
contrary, UDOT's November, 1981 inspection revealed no 
hazards then existing which justified upgrading the warning 
devices. The inspection report dated November 10, 1981, 
specifically states: "No sight dist. restrictions." 
(R.302). However, the inspection team did recommend, based 
upon a predicted future significant increase in vehicular 
traffic, that upgrading take place "at such time as federal 
funding became available." (R.305, 312). Specifically, only 
100 cars per day were using the crossing as of the November, 
1981 inspection (R.176); however, based upon information 
received from Tooele County, the inspection team projected 
that 1,500 vehicles per day were "expected" to use the 
crossing in the future. (R.176, 305, 312, 359). This 
prediction, however, did not come true as determined by 
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ongoing monitoring of the crossing by UDOT. UDOT reviewed 
the issue again in June, 1982 and consciously decided 
against making the crossing a "high priority." (R.352, 351, 
358). According to UDOT and Federal Highway Administration 
("FHWA") officials, the crossing was not ranked high enough 
on the state's "hazardous index," which was the priority 
ranking system being used then, to warrant making any 
improvements at that time (R.356-357, 317-315). UDOT made 
another inspection on June 3, 1983, some seven weeks after 
the accident. This inspection determined that daily useage 
was up to only 580 vehicles per day, far short of the 1500 
vehicles per day erroneously projected in 1981. (R.301). 
In short, UDOT did not fail to implement a decision to 
install automatic signals at the crossing. UDOT monitored 
the crossing and simply determined that the actual vehicle 
count did not justify installation of automcttic signals. 
Accordingly, there is no evidenciary basis for arguing that 
UDOT was negligent in failing to implement it's earlier 
recommendation. UDOT simply changed it's recommendation 
because of a change in the facts regarding the vehicle 
count. 
Plaintiffs also distort the facts by implying, at page 
7, that the accident happened "through no fault of their 
own;" that "hazardous conditions" existed at the crossing; 
and that UDOT and/or Union Pacific were negligent in causing 
Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's - 3 -
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the accident. These are totally unsupported allegations 
without any foundation in the record. To the contrary, 
Judge Hanson observed at p. 2 of his "Memorandum Decision/1 
that "there was no evidence to support the plaintiffs' 
claims that the Railroad operated the train in a negligent 
manner (R. 487); and at pp. 10-11, that: 
"While any railroad crossing can be hazardous, it 
is hard to imagine a crossing that presents a 
smaller hazard than the one in question before the 
Court." (R.479-478). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence or finding that plaintiffs 
decedents were free of fault in causing the accident. The 
issues of the negligence of the driver, Patrick Duncan, and 
the role played by the drugs and alcohol were not argued to 
or addressed by the trial court or on appeal. Accordingly, 
it is inappropriate for plaintiffs to conclude that their 
decedents were without fault in causing the accident and to 
then argue based upon such a bare assertion, that "laudatory 
tort theories and public policy concerns" which legitimately 
support recovery by fault-free injured persons against 
negligent tort feasers also support their cause here. 
POINT II. 
Plaintiffs Misstate the Law 
It is incorrect for plaintiffs to argue, at p. 8, that 
this Court's decision in this case "relieved railroads from 
traditional duties to answer for damages arising out of 
Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's - 4 -
hazardous railroad crossings." That statement is erroneous 
for at least two reasons: 
First, nothing in the Court's decision relieves 
railroads from their "traditional11 duties of using due care 
in appropriately operating train warning devices (whistle, 
bell and lights), in operating the train at a reasonable 
speed, in the train crew maintaining a reasonable lookout, 
in maintaining the physical structure of the crossing so 
that automobiles can have a reasonably smooth and 
unobstructed drive over the tracks, and in not creating 
obstructions to view at the crossing with respect to matters 
over which railroads have control (e.g., vegetation on the 
right of way). 
Second, it is the legislature which "relieved" the 
railroads of a duty to evaluate and signalize extra 
hazardous crossings, not the Court. The Court simply 
confirmed the public policy decisions made earlier by the 
legislature which established an orderly statutory scheme 
for assigning responsibilities for safety at railroad 
crossings. Furthermore, the legislature's decision to place 
exclusive responsibility for evaluating and signalizing 
railroad crossings with UDOT is now fully supported by 
federal enactments [Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970 
("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C. S 421 et seg. and Highway Safety Act, 23 
U.S.C. § 401 et seg.], and federal court decisions. In the 
Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's - 5 -
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closely analogous case of Hatfield v. Burlington Northern R. 
Co., 958 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1992) (copy attached as Exhibit 
"A"), decided after submission of the briefs in this case, 
the Tenth Circuit specifically ruled that: 
1. Section 434 of the FRSA expressly preempts 
state law regarding the adequacy of railroad 
crossing warning devices; 
2. The preemption occurred upon the Federal 
Highway Administration adopting the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD"), which 
set nationally uniform standards for evaluating 
and signalizing railroad crossings; 
3. The federal government has delegated to state 
agencies the exclusive responsibility to evaluate 
and install warning devices at railroad crossings, 
in accordance with MUTCD standards ; and, 
4. Railroads have been absolved from complying 
with duties imposed by state (statutory or common) 
law regarding safety devices at railroad 
crossings. 
Thus, Utah's statutory scheme which assigned exclusive 
responsibility to evaluate and signalize railroad crossings 
to UDOT is in harmony with federal requirements, and this 
Court's decision in Duncan is therefore correct. 
Plaintiffs also misstate the law, at p. 8, regarding 
the Railroad's obligation to pay the costs of installing 
Utah has statutorily adopted the MUTCD as the state 
standard for traffic control devices at U.C.A. S 41-6-20. 
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automatic warning devices. Preemptive federal regulations 
[23 C.F.R. § 646.210(a) and (b)(1)] state that:: 
"(a) State laws requiring railroads to share in 
the cost of work for the elimination of hazards at 
railroad-highway crossings shall not apply to 
Federal-Aid projects. 
(b) Pursuant to 23 U.S.C. S 130(b), and 49 CFR S 
1.48: 
(1) Projects for grade crossing improvements are 
deemed to be of no ascertainable net benefit to 
the railroads and there shall be no required 
railroad share of the costs." 
(emphasis added). Thus, consistent with federal guidelines, 
governmental authorities (federal and local agencies) paid 
the complete cost of the subsequently installed warning 
device improvements at the Droubay crossing, with Union 
Pacific assuming the continuing maintenance expenses. These 
ongoing expenses traditionally far exceed installation 
costs. 
Plaintiffs erroneously state, at p. 9, that "there is 
absolutely no reason the state's duty [to evaluate the need 
for and install automatic devices] precludes the railroad 
from having a concurrent duty." Federal and state statutory 
schemes (FRSA and S 54-4-14 et seq.) delegate exclusive 
responsibility for this function to UDOT (and the Public 
Service Commission on appeal) and leave no room whatsoever 
for any part of this responsibility to be delegated to or 
assumed by the Railroad. Indeed, any such duty which might 
be imposed statutorily or by the courts would run contrary 
Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's - 7 -
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to and be preempted by the FRSA as interpreted in Hatfield, 
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the specific language 
of paragraph 8D-1 of the MUTCD: 
,f
. . .effectively prohibits a railroad from acting 
on its own to select and install a safety 
device,. . .moreover, it absolves the railroad of 
any independent duty regarding grade crossing 
safety devices.fl 
958 F.2d at 323. 
Plaintiffs also misinterpret § 56-1-11. That section 
does not and should not be interpreted to impose a duty upon 
railroads to signalize crossings. As discussed at pp. 22-23 
of defendants' brief on appeal, prior decisions of this 
Court indicate that the "good and sufficient crossings" 
language of § 56-1-11 delegates to railroads the 
responsibility to maintain a crossing surface which allows 
motorists to make a reasonably smooth and obstruction free 
drive over a railroad crossing, not a duty to construct 
warning devices. There are no decisions which support 
plaintiffs' interpretation. In fact, it would be 
inappropriate to interpret this statute as argued by 
plaintiffs since to do so would place it in direct conflict 
with § 54-4-14, et seq., and the federal statutory 
preemption imposed by the FRSA. 
Plaintiffs misstate the effect of Utah Court of 
Appeals' holding in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R. Co., 
749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and this Court's ruling in 
Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's - 8 -
Duncan. The holdings in these two cases are not 
inconsistent in any way. Indeed, the decisions are totally 
consistent with each other and with state and federal 
statutory enactments and federal case law, as earlier 
explained. Gleave and Duncan are in total harmony in 
stating that railroads have no duty with respect to the 
function of evaluating or installing automatic warning 
devices at railroad crossings. The cases are also in total 
agreement in stating that in spite of being relieved of this 
responsibility, railroads continue to have duties to operate 
their trains with reasonable care and to remove visual 
obstructions at crossings over which they have control, such 
as obstructions on their rights of way. Defendants submit 
that such rulings and standards of care are simple to 
understand and apply by trial courts and counsel. 
Finally, defendants do not rely on the federal 
preemption argument except to the extent that it is fully 
supportive of Gleave1s and Duncanf s interpretation of 
S 54-14-14, et seq. as preempting the Railroad's common law 
duty regarding evaluating and signalizing railroad 
crossings. Indeed, there is nothing here for federal law to 
preempt since the state is in full conformity with federal 
statutory requirements, as explained in Hatfield. 
Preemption would only occur if state law were interpreted to 
Union Pacific Railroad Company's and Paul Kleinman's - 9 -
impose such a duty on railroads which would be contrary to 
the requirements of the FRSA. 
CONCLUSION 
When viewed in the light of the correctly stated facts 
and law, plaintiffs' arguments raise nothing new for the 
Court's consideration. The arguments are based upon faulty 
premises and should be rejected on this basis alone. The 
arguments also run counter to the stated rationale which 
underlies the decisions in both Duncan and Hatfield, of not 
wanting to circumvent the careful and orderly macro-view 
approach to addressing railroad crossing safety matters that 
has been structured by legislators and public agencies on 
both the state and national levels. As stated in Hatfield: 
"Continuing resort to common law standards after a 
state adopts MUTCD disrupts a basic purpose of 
FRSA as it is implemented by the provision of 
funding, namely, recognition of priorities. FRSA 
contemplates that some sites are more dangerous 
than others and that resources should first be put 
to use on the more dangerous ones, all in 
accordance with a rational scheme based on 
surveys. This is a prospective-looking system. 
Jury verdicts based on common law standards, which 
are of a high degree of abstraction and 
generality, are retrospective-looking and are 
addressed to only one crossing rather than a 
system of crossings. The hit-or-miss common law 
method runs counter to a statutory scheme of 
planned prioritization." 
958 F.2d at 324. 
Union Pacific submits that the Court's decision in 
Duncan is correct, that plaintiffs have provided no basis 
TTni'nn D a r « i f i r < P a i 1 m a H nr\mr\2kr\ir • e an/i D a n 1 V l o ^ n m a n ' s - 1H — 
for the Court to reconsider it's decision, and that 
plaintiff's petition should be denied. 
DATED this *f^ day of September, 1992. 
J.nSTare Williams 
406 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Union Pacific 
Railroad Company and Robert 
Kleinman 
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Robert E. HATFIELD, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, 
No. 91-3158. 
United States Court of Appeals. 
Tenth Circuit. 
March 6, 1992. 
Truck driver brought action against 
railroad to recover for injuries caused by 
truck-train collision. Railroad moved for 
summary judgment on issue whether rail-
road was required to install active warning 
devices at cross. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Kansas. 757 
F.Supp. 1198, Patrick F. Kelly, Circuit 
Judge, held that date of Kansas Depart-
ment of Transportation's approval of 
project to install signals at crossing was 
earliest possible date that federal law 
preempted railroad's common-law duty, de-
nied the motion and railroad appealed. The 
Court of Appeals. John P. Moore, Circuit 
Judge, held that once the Secretary of 
Transportation adopted the Manual on Uni-
form Traffic Control Devices on Streets 
and Highways, state regulation of railroad 
grade crossings was preempted, even if 
there had been no determination as to what 
the specific device would be required for a 
given grade crossing. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Federal Courts «»766 
Court of Appeals will apply de novo 
standard of review when considering a de 
cision on summary judgment and will use 
the same standard applied in the district 
court. 
2. Federal Courts «=>766 
If no genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Court of Appeals will determine if 
substantive law was correctly applied by 
• TjjC Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States 
District Court Judge for the Western District of 
district court when it issued decision on 
summary judgment. 
3. Railroads ®»243, 307(3) 
States <s=>18.21 
Once the Secretary of Transportation 
adopted the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices on Streets and Highways, 
state regulation of railroad grade crossings 
was preempted, even if there had been no 
determination as to what the specific device 
would be required for a given grade cross-
ing; Manual contained federal standard for 
grade crossings. Federal Railroad Safety 
Act of 1970, §§ 101 et seq., 204(a, b), 205. 
45 U.S.C.A. §§ 421 et seq., 433(a, b), 434. 
Phillip R, Fields, Wichita. Kan., for de-
fendant-appellant. 
Timothy J. King (Terry S. Stephens, with 
him. on the briefs) of Stinson, Lassweil & 
Wilson. Wichita, Kan.f for plaintiff-appel-
lee. 
Before McKAY and MOORE, Circuit 
Judges, and ALLEY, District Judge.* 
JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge. 
I. 
This is an interlocutory appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) from a decision denying 
Burlington Northern Railroad Companys 
motion for partial summary judgment on 
the issue of whether Robert E. Hatfield's 
common law negligence claim arising from 
a grade crossing collision is preempted by 
the Federal Railroad Safety Act The dis-
trict court held preemption had not oc-
curred. Hatfield v. Burlington Northern 
R.R. Co., 757 F.Supp. 1198 (D.Kan.1991). 
We reach the opposite conclusion and re-
verse. 
Plaintiff Hatfield filed a multi-claim com-
plaint alleging the defendant Burlington 
Northern Railroad was negligent because, 
among other reasons, it did not install an 
active warning device at a grade crossing 
Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 
HATFIELD v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN R. CO. 321 
Cite M 938 F2d 320 (10th Clr. 1992) 
where a truck he was driving coiiided with 143 (10th Cir.1988). If no genuine issue of 
one of Burlington's trains. At the time of material fact exists, we determine if the 
the collision, the crossing was marked oniy substantive law was correctly applied. Ap-
by a standard crossbuck sign. Buriington plied Genetics Int% Inc. v. First AjfH-
moved for partial summary judgment on iated Sec, Inc.. 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th 
this claim, contending it had been preempt- Cir.1990). Because there are no disputed 
ed by the Federal Railroad Safety Act facts, the issue before us is ripe for sum-
(FRSA), 45 U.S.C. § 421 et seq., and rail- mary determination. 
road safety rules, standards, and regula-
tions adopted by the Secretary of Transpor- II. 
t a t i o n
-^ [3] In 1970, with the adoption of FRSA. 
The district court denied the motion. An- Congress required the Secretary of Trans-
alyzing the issue of preemption.1 the court portation to study and develop solutions to 
concluded Congress explicitly expressed an problems associated with railroad grade 
intent in FRSA § 434 to preempt the sub- crossings. 45 U.S.C. § 433(a) (1976). 
ject of adequate crossing warnings once FRSA also directs the Secretary to address 
the Secretary of Transportation has acted the grade crossing safety problem under 
upon this subject,2 but found no such action his authority over highway traffic and 
had occurred. Despite Burlington's argu- safety. 45 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1976). Under 
ment that the Secretary took that action by the Highway Safety Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-
adopting the Manual on Uniform Traffic 404 (1982), the Secretary lias the responsi-
Control Devices on Streets and Highways bility to develop uniform standards and to 
(MUTCD), the court held that preemption approve state-designed highway safety pro-
does not occur until a formal determination grams as a condition precedent to the re-
is made under the MUTCD of the exact ceipt by the state of federal highway 
type of warning device to be installed at funds. Through the Federal Highway Ad-
the crossing. Following the district court's ministration, the Secretary prescribed pro-
certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), this cedures to obtain uniformity in highway 
appeal was taken. traffic control devices and adopted the 
[1,2] We apply a de novo standard of MUTCD. 23 C.F.R. § 655.601 (1981).* 
review when considering a decision on sum- With this background, we begin our 
mary judgment, Barnson v. United States, analysis by agreeing with the district court 
816 F.2d 549, 552 (10th Cir.). cert denied, that § 434 of FRSA states an express pre-
484 U.S. 896, 108 S.Ct 229, 98 LEd.2d 188 emption of state law. We also agree pre-
(1987), and we use the same standard ap- emption does not occur until the Secretary 
plied in the district court. Osgood v. State adopts a rule, regulation, or standard cov-
Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, ering the subject matter of the state law. 
1. State law is preempted under the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution in three 
circumstances. English v. General Elec Co., 496 
VS. 72. 7S-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275. 110 LEcL2d 
65 (1990). First Congress can define explicitly 
the extent to which its enactments preempt state 
law. Id. Second, a pervasive scheme of federal 
regulation may indicate congressional intent to 
occupy an entire field. Third, state law is 
preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with 
federal law. Id. 
2. Section 434 states in part: 
The Congress declares that laws, rules, regu-
lations, orders, and standards relating to rail-
road safety shall be nationally uniform to the 
extent practicable. A State mav adopt or con-
tinue in force any law, rule, regulation, order. 
or standard relating to railroad safety until 
suck time as the Secretary (of Transportation/ 
has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or stan* 
dard covering the subject matter of such State 
requirement A State may adopt or continue 
in force an additional or more stringent law. 
rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to 
railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or 
reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and 
when not incompatible with any Federal law. 
rule, regulation, order, or standard, and when 
not creating an undue burden on interstate 
commerce. 
45 U.S.C. § 434 (emphasis added). 
3. Kansas has specifically adopted the MUTCD 
standards at KaiuStaiAnn. § 8-2003 and 
Kan.Admm.Regs. B2-7-4(c) (1989). 
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Thus, we must determine whether any of and granted partial summary judgment be-
the standards adopted by the Secretary cause prior to plaintiffs accident, the local 
cover the subject matter of the duty to agency determined the necessary safety de-
install active warning devices at railroad vices at the crossing and certified that the 
crossings where unusuaily dangerous con- project was complete. In Anderson v. Chi-
ditions exist4 cago Cent & Pac. R.R. Co., 771 F.Supp. 
227 (N.D.I11.1991), the court found the rail-
"'• road failed to present evidence that the 
While this court has not addressed the Illinois Commerce Commission made any 
question, it has arisen in other courts with determination under the MUTCD on the 
mixed results. In Marshall v. Burlington type of warning device to be installed at 
Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th the crossing where the collision occurred. 
Cir.1983), the court said:
 I n Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 
The [MUTCD] prescribes that the selec- p 2 d 1548 (11th Cir.1991), the court held 
tion of devices at grade crossing and the preemption did not occur where a state, 
approval for federal funds is to be made because of financial constraints, failed to 
by iocal agencies with jurisdiction over implement a decision to install a particular 
the crossing. Thus, the Secretary has
 s i g n a l d e v i c e # p j , ^ ^ Southern Pac. 
delegated federal authority to regulate Transp. Co. v. Maga Trucking Co., 758 
grade crossings to local agencies. F.Supp. 608 (D.Nev.1991), although citing 
The locality in charge of the crossing Marshall the court found no preemption 
in question has made no determination where the Nevada Public Service Commis-
under the manual regarding the type of
 3 j o n had issued a report recommending the 
warning device to be installed at the crossing be upgraded with flashing lights 
crossing. Until a federal decision is and automatic gates, but, at the time of the 
reached through the local agency on the accident the improvements had not been 
adequacy of the warning devices at the
 m a d e because the railroad claimed it had 
crossing, the railroad's duty under appli-
 n o t re ived federal funds. 
cable state law to maintain a "good and 
safe" crossing is not preempted. 
Following Marshall in Nixon v. Burling-
ton Northern R.R., No. CV 85-384-BLG- The dilemma presented by these varied 
JFB, 1988 WL 215409 (D.Mont May 2, results must be solved by resort to the 
1988), the court found preemption because, language in the regulations adopted by the 
prior to the incident in litigation, the State Secretary. First, all traffic control devices 
of Montana made an agreement with the proposed for railroad crossings must com-
raiiroad to install flashing light signals ply with the uniform federal standards ex-
with automatic gates at the crossing where pressed in the MUTCD. 23 C.F.R. § 646.-
the incident occurred. In Smith v. Norfolk 214(bXD.5 Second, all states must adopt 
& Western Ry. Co., 776 F.Supp. 1335 the MUTCD and its revisions in order to 
(N.D.Ind.1991), the court applied Marshall receive federal highway funding. 23 
4. Courts have found the Secretary has acted 
upon other safety subjects. See, e.g., Burlington 
Northern RJL Co. v. State of Mont.. 880 F.2d 
1104 (9th Or. 1989) (cabooses); Burlington 
Northern R.R. Co. v. State of Minn., 882 F.2d 
1349 (8th Cir.1989) (cabooses): Sisk v. National 
HR. Passenger Corp., 647 F.Supp. 861 (D.Kan. 
1986) (speed limit); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Public 
Utils. Commn of Ohio, 901 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 
1990) (hazardous materials), cert, denied, — 
US. , HI S.CL 781, 112 LEoUd 845 (1991); 
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Public Utils. 
Commn of Ohio. 926 F.2d 567 (6th Cir.1991) 
(walkways); but see Southern Pac, Transp Co 
v. Public Utils. Commn of CaL 820 F.2d 1111 
(9th Cir.1987) (track clearance and walkways); 
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Railroad Comm h of Tex., 
850 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1988) (cabooses), cert, 
denied, 488 VS. 1009, 109 S.CL 794, 102 UEdld 
785 (1989) 
5. Fills provision relates to "grade crossing im-
provements and states: "All traffic control de-
vices proposed shall comply with the latest edi-
tion of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices for Streets and Highways supplemented 
to the extent applicable by State standards." 
HATFIELD v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN R. CO. 
Cite as 958 F2d 320 (10th Or. 1992) 323 
C.F.R. § 655.603(b)(1). Third, the MUTCD 
standards are "intended for use both in 
new installations and at locations where 
general replacement of present apparatus 
is made." MUTCD, 18A-2. 
Fourth, the MUTCD specifically states: 
With due regard for safety and for the 
integrity of operations by highway and 
railroad users, the highway agency and 
the railroad company are entitled to joint-
ly occupy the right-of-way in the conduct 
of their assigned duties. This requires 
joint responsibility in the traffic control 
function between the public agency and 
the railroad. The determination of need 
and selection of devices at a grade cross-
ing is made by the public agency with 
jurisdictional authority. Subject to such 
determination and selection, the design, 
installation and operation shall be in ac-
cordance with the national standards con-
tained herein. 
MUTCD, Part VIII. " 8A-1. This provision 
is particularly important for two reasons. 
One. it circumscribes the authority to de-
termine what "devices'' shall be erected at 
a grade crossing to "the public agency with 
jurisdictional authority." Two, it also 
makes the "installation and operation'' of 
such devices subject to the determination 
of that agency. Thus, until a determina-
tion of need is made, no new device can be 
installed or operated at a crossing. 
The operation of !J!18A-1 and 2 results in 
a consequence which concerned the district 
court. Assuming preemption occurred 
when the MUTCD was adopted or when the 
Secretary promulgated 23 C.F.R. § 646.-
200. the court reasoned that a significant 
delay could be encountered before a safety 
device would be installed. The court be-
lieved this "gap period" is inconsistent with 
"the recognized view that '§ 434 manifests 
an intent to avoid gaps in safety regula-
tions.' " Hatfield 757 F.Supp. at 1205. 
Moreover, the court found "no regulation 
promulgated by the Secretary . . . which 
6. See also Kan^taLAnn. § 8-1512 which states: 
(a) No person snail place, maintain or display 
upon or in view of any highway any unautho-
would prohibit a railroad from voluntarily 
deciding to put in place an improved warn-
ing device . . . during the gap period." Id. 
at 1206. Thus, the court reasoned, the 
railroad has the authority (and assumably 
the duty) to install an improved warning 
device at a dangerous crossing during the 
"gap period." We disagree. 
The district court's conclusion overlooks 
the specific language of MUTCD 18D-1 
which states: 
The selection of traffic control devices 
at a grade crossing is determined by 
public agencies having jurisdictional re-
sponsibility at specific locations 
Due to the large number of significant 
variables which must be considered there 
is no single standard system of active 
traffic control devices universally appli-
cable for grade crossings. Based on an 
engineering and traffic investigation, a 
determination is made whether any ac-
tive traffic control system is required at 
a crossing and, if so, what type is appro-
priate. Before a new or modified grade 
crossing traffic control system is in-
stalled, approval is required from the 
appropriate agency within a given 
State. 
(emphasis added). This regulation effec-
tively prohibits a railroad from acting on 
its own to select and instill a safety device, 
contrary to the district court's conclusion. 
Moreover, it absolves the railroad of any 
independent duty regarding grade crossing 
safety devices.6 
VI. 
The scheme of regulation is patent. Con-
gress expressed an intent to invade the 
field of grade crossing safety devices, post-
poning that invasion only until the Secre-
tary of Transportation adopted a rule, reg-
ulation, order, requirement, or standard re-
lating to that field. The Secretary has 
responded by adopting the MUTCD and 
making it applicable to grade crossings. 
Recognizing the variability of conditions 
that can arise at each intersection, the Sec-
rued sign, signal, marking or device which 
purports to be or is an imitation of or resem-
bles an official . . . railroad sign or signai. 
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retary has delegated to local authority the 
responsibility of assessing the needs and 
establishing the design for safety devices. 
Nonetheless, the statutory mandate for the 
adoption of a standard that would supple-
ment any state requirement for grade 
crossing safety devices is satisfied by the 
adoption of the MLTCD. To that extent 
then, we disagree with Marshall 
Our disagreement with Marshall goes 
beyond our differing analysis of language 
in FRSA and MUTCD pertaining to pre-
emption of common law standards of care 
for grade crossings, however. Continuing 
resort to common law standards after a 
state adopts MUTCD disrupts a basic pur-
pose of FRSA as it is implemented by the 
provision of funding, namely, recognition 
of priorities. FRSA contemplates that 
some sites are more dangerous than others 
and that resources should first be put to 
use on the more dangerous ones, all in 
accordance with a rational scheme based on 
surveys. This is a prospective-looking sys-
tem. Jury verdicts based on common law 
standards, which are of a high degree of 
abstraction and generality, are retrospec-
tive-looking and are addressed to only one 
crossing rather than a system of crossings. 
The hit-or-miss common law method runs 
counter to a statutory scheme of planned 
prioritization. 
Having adopted the MLTCD, the Secre-
tary prescribed the standard required by 45 
U.S.C. § 434. and any state law relating to 
grade crossing safety devices was then su-
perseded. All § 434 requires for preemp-
tion to occur is the adoption of the stan-
dard, and the MUTCD contains the stan-
dard. Postponing the determination of 
what specific device is required for a given 
grade crossing is simply a matter of imple-
menting that standard. The scheme enact-
ed by Congress did not anticipate that the 
effect of the standard was to be deferred 
or made selectively applicable for each 
grade crossing in the United States. To 
the contrary, once the Secretary adopted 
the standard, its superseding effect became 
uniform throughout the nation 
We do not believe leaving responsibility 
for implementation of the standard to local 
authority diminishes this result Requiring 
a local survey of grade crossings to deter-
mine need and design is no more than a 
pragmatic response to the multitude of con-
ditions that exist throughout the country 
which dictate whether and what kind of a 
device is required at a specific place. 
Nonetheless, with the adoption of the 
MUTCD, the Secretary has absolved rail-
roads from complying with duties imposed 
by state law regarding safety devices at 
grade crossings. Without such a duty, a 
railroad cannot be liable in common law 
negligence for failure to provide adequate 
safety devices at a grade crossing. 
The judgment of the district court is 
REVERSED and REMANDED with in-
structions to grant defendants motion for 
summary partial judgment and for further 
proceedings on plaintiffs remaining claims. 
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